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Madrid v. Schreiber9/14/2005
ork performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." (Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1146.)
There is no evidence of quid pro quo harassment. Even if Schreiber was an employee of either Madrid or Parkside, the record does not include any evidence that suggests that Schreiber's submission to sexual conduct was a condition of any employment benefits. Nor is there any evidence of harassment based upon a hostile environment. "`For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 130, quoting Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986) 477 U.S. 57, 67 [106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49].) "The plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct would have interfered with a reasonable employee's work performance and would have seriously affected the psychological well-being of a reasonable employee and that she was actually offended." (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 609-610, fn. omitted.) The evidence submitted by Solo does not remotely suggest harassment, let alone the kind of severe or pervasive harassment necessary to support a claim of hostile environment harassment.
Schreiber, of course, would be in the best position to know whether she was the subject of any unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other conduct of a sexual nature. Yet she provides no declaration, deposition testimony, or other evidence suggesting such conduct. The writings from Madrid indicate that, at most, Madrid "adored" Schreiber as a "friend" and a "woman." Although Madrid expresses concern that he "annoyed" her on one occasion, there is nothing to indicate that such annoyance was of a sexual nature. Indeed, there is no evidence that Madrid ever said anything of a sexual nature to Schreiber, made any offensive jokes or comments, touched Schreiber in any way, or did anything to Schreiber that was perceived as unwelcome by Schreiber, other than terminate her services as a sales representative.
Based upon the evidence in the record submitted in connection with the anti-SLAPP motion, we conclude that plaintiffs have made a sufficient prima facie showing that Schreiber and Solo lacked probable cause to bring the underlying action for sexual harassment.
C. Malice
"`The malice element of the malicious prosecution tort goes to the defendant's subjective intent . . . . It is not limited to actual hostility or ill will toward the plaintiff.' [Citation.] It can exist, for example, where the proceedings are initiated for the purpose of forcing a settlement which has no relation to the merits of the claim. A lack of probable cause is a factor that may be considered in determining if the claim was p
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