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Madrid v. Schreiber9/14/2005
auses of action, one of which was based upon probable cause and the other two were pursued without probable cause and with malice, the defendant would have a cause of action for malicious prosecution following a favorable termination of the underlying action. (Videotape Plus, Inc. v. Lyons (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 156, 161-162.) Thus, in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion directed at a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiffs in the Malicious Prosecution Action need only make a prima facie showing that one of the theories asserted in the underlying action was brought without probable cause and with malice.
As we explain below, Madrid and Parkside have made a sufficient showing that they are likely to prevail on their Malicious Prosecution Action based upon Schreiber's cause of action for sexual harassment.
A. Favorable Termination
In determining whether the prior action resulted in a favorable termination, "` t is not essential to maintenance of an action for malicious prosecution that the prior proceeding was favorably terminated following trial on the merits.' [Citation.] Rather, ` n order for the termination of a lawsuit to be considered favorable to the malicious prosecution plaintiff, the termination must reflect the merits of the action and the plaintiff's innocence of the misconduct alleged in the lawsuit.' [Citation.] . . . . [ ] . . . Thus, a `technical or procedural [termination] as distinguished from a substantive termination' is not favorable for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. [Citation.]" (Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 341-342.)
Here, in granting summary adjudication as to Schreiber's cause of action for sexual harassment, the court stated: "So even assuming that the plaintiff were an employee of [Madrid], . . . [Schreiber] cannot establish sexual harassment of either kind [i.e., hostile work environment or quid pro quo harassment]. Her own testimony of [Madrid's] conduct . . . just simply does not arise to the level of what we consider sexual harassment under current California law." Turning to the evidence submitted by Schreiber, the court states that she "submits an additional 25 facts but none of those facts . . . really address that [Madrid's] conduct toward her as constituting any form of sexual harassment under current California law. [ ] And so . . . that issue should be disposed of. Summary adjudication should be granted on the first cause of action for sexual harassment." The court's written order further states that Schreiber "had not produced any facts concerning [Madrid's] conduct which represented any form of illegal harassment under California law." The court's ruling was unquestionably a decision on the merits of the harassment claim and reflects Madrid's and Parkside's "innocence of the misconduct alleged in the lawsuit." The adjudication thus constitutes a favorable termination for purposes of malicious prosecution.
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