|
|
HAMMOCK v. RYDER DEDICATED LOGISTICS3/20/1998
ired on July 4, however, he also asserts that, after July 4, Ryder offered him a settlement if he would resign.
In Avondale Mills, Inc. v. Weldon, 680 So.2d 364 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996), this court held that the employee had failed to present substantial evidence that he had been "terminated." In Weldon, the employee was prevented from working certain positions because of his medical restrictions. Id. at 367. However, when his employer offered him a position within his restrictions, he refused the offer. Id. It is undisputed that in December 1996, one month before Hammock filed his complaint, Ryder contacted him and told him that a new light-duty position within his restrictions was available and offered him the position. Hammock refused the job.
Further, an essential element that the employee must prove in order to establish a retaliatory discharge is that he is ready, willing, and able to return to his job. Consolidated Stores, Inc. v. Gargis, 686 So.2d 268, 273 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996). Hammock states that he told Ryder that he desired to return to his position as a cargo handler. There is no dispute that under his medical restrictions, Hammock was not able to return to his job as a cargo handler. Hammock was told that he could return to his job as a cargo handler if he got a release for such work from his doctor. Ryder argues that Hammock could have returned to that position at any time after supplying Ryder with a medical release. Hammock admits that he never got a medical release and that he was not physically able to perform
all the duties of a cargo handler. Hammock states that he could perform only about 50% of the work. We note that under the workers' compensation law, Ryder was not required to create a light-duty position, nor was it required to provide the employee with accommodations to aid his ability to perform the job. See Lambert v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 695 So.2d 44, 47 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997).
Hammock also argues, in the alternative, that he was "constructively terminated." "An employee proves constructive termination by presenting substantial evidence that the employer deliberately made the employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee was forced to resign." Keystone Foods Corp. v. Meeks, 662 So.2d 235 (Ala. 1995). Hammock asserts that his employment with Ryder was terminated on July 4, 1996, but that later Gray offered him a settlement if he would voluntarily resign. In fact, Hammock stated in his deposition that he told Gray that he would not resign and that he did not resign. Moreover, proof that one is "ready, willing and able to return to his job" is also required to establish a claim of constructive discharge. See Consolidated Stores, Inc. v. Gargis, 686 So.2d at 274.
Viewing the facts in light most favorable to Hammock, we find that Ryder presented substantial evidence making a prima facie showing that there were no genuine issues of materi
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Show All Case Laws Alabama PEO
|