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HAMMOCK v. RYDER DEDICATED LOGISTICS3/20/1998
This is an appeal of a summary judgment entered in favor of the employer on claims alleging retaliatory discharge and the tort of outrage.
On January 24, 1997, James Hammock filed a complaint against Ryder Dedicated Logistics, Inc. Hammock claimed that he was entitled to workers' compensation benefits for an injury he had sustained to his hand while working for Ryder. Hammock also alleged that Ryder had discharged him from his employment in retaliation for his making a workers' compensation claim (see § 25-5-11.1, Ala. Code 1975), and he also claimed Ryder had committed the tort of outrage. The workers' compensation claim was settled and the trial court approved the settlement on August 22, 1997. Ryder moved for a summary judgment on the claims alleging retaliatory discharge and the tort of outrage. On September 29, 1997, the trial court held a hearing on the summary judgment motion, and on October 7, 1997, it entered a summary judgment for Ryder on both claims. Hammock appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which deflected the case to this court pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.
A summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala. 1988). The moving party must present, in support of its motion, evidence that would be admissible at trial. Rule 56(e) Ala. R. Civ. P. When the moving party makes a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to rebut that showing by presenting substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989). Evidence is "substantial" if it is "of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).
Hammock began working as a cargo handler for Ryder in October 1994. On May 10, 1995, while working in the line and scope of his employment with Ryder, Hammock injured his left hand when a stack of bread trays collapsed. Hammock was off from work because of his injury from May 10, 1995, to February 1996.
In February 1996, Hammock's doctor allowed him to return to work, but under light-duty restrictions. Under these restrictions, Hammock was unable to return to his job as a cargo handler. Ryder created a light-duty position within Hammock's restrictions, and Hammock began working in that position upon his return in February. The light-duty job consisted of answering the telephone, doing light janitorial work, and keeping a record of which trucks were in the parking lot. Hammock received the same pay for the light-duty job that he had received as a cargo handler.
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