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Denver Publishing Co. v. Bueno9/16/2002
l serve where the offense does not lower that individual's reputation in the community.
The question then is what is the nature of the interest that the tort protects? Scholars writing on false light variously describe the protected interest as "peace of mind," "injury to the inner person," "freedom from scorn and ridicule, freedom from embarrassment, humiliation and harassment, freedom from personal outrage, freedom from injury to feelings, freedom from mental anguish, freedom from contempt and disgrace, and the right to be let alone." Ray, supra, at 726 (citation omitted) (adding the protection of one's right to "self- determination" to the list). Lying at the core of all these "interests" are the personal feelings of the false light plaintiff. The issue is not whether others are given cause to change their perception of the plaintiff, but how the plaintiff himself responds to the publication.
Courts that recognize false light view one's reputation in the community and one's personal sense of offense as separate interests. See Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d. 70, 83 (W.Va. 1984) ("`Secondly, in defamation cases the interest sought to be protected is the objective one of reputation, . . . . In privacy cases the interest affected is the subjective one of injury to inner person.'") (quoting Thomas I. Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 329, 333 (1979). But even those states that accept as important the difference between these two interests, reputation and personal feelings, recognize an "affinity" between them:
There are differing interests protected by the law of defamation and the law of privacy, which account for the substantive gradations between these torts. The interest protected by the duty not to place another in a false light is that of the individual's peace of mind, i.e., his or her interest "in not being made to appear before the public in an objectionable false light or false position, or in other words, otherwise than as he is." "The action for defamation," on the other hand, "is to protect a person's interest in a good reputation . . . ." Nevertheless, despite analytical distinctions, there is a conceptual affinity between the causes of action based on these two theories. Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 290 (N.J. 1988) (citations omitted).
We believe that recognition of the different interests protected rests primarily on parsing a too subtle distinction between an individual's personal sensibilities and his or her reputation in the community. In fact, the United States Supreme Court trampled any such subtleties in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). "`The interest protected' in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light `is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation.'" Id. at 573 (quoting Prosser, supra, at 400.
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