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Harris County v. Nash5/18/2000
ary power, or 2) perfect a timely appeal of that judgment. See Inglish, 945 S.W.2d at 811.
We are bound by the law as set out in Mafrige and its progeny and by our own precedent as set out in Lehmann. A trial court has plenary jurisdiction over its judgment until it becomes final. See Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam). On the authority of our 1999 Lehmann decision, we hold in the present case that the trial court incorrectly denied appellant's plea to the jurisdiction. Under Lehmann, the summary judgment order of November 5, 1998 was final. As such, the trial court's plenary jurisdiction ended on February 18, 1999, 30 days after the motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e). Respondent did not ask the trial court to correct the summary judgment containing the Mother Hubbard language until July 19, 1999, well after the trial court lost its plenary power. Any action taken by the trial court after the expiration of its plenary jurisdiction is void. See Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 808 (Tex. 1983). Therefore, we sustain appellant's point of error.
We reverse the trial court's order denying Harris County's plea to the jurisdiction, and we set aside the actions of the trial court dated after February 18, 1999 for lack of jurisdiction.
Judgment rendered and Opinion filed May 18, 2000.
Publish -- TEX. R. APP. P. 47.3(b).
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