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Harris County v. Nash5/18/2000
of the trial court is not the controllingconsideration in determining whether a judgment is final. Rather, if a judgment contains language purporting to grant or deny relief that disposes of all claims or parties, regardless of the intent of the parties or the trial court, that judgment is finalas to all claims and all parties. See Inglish, 945 S.W.2d at 811; Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 592. The Texas Supreme Court stated, " he inclusionof Mother Hubbard language or its equivalent in an order granting summary judgment makes an otherwise partial summary judgment final for appellate purposes." Bandera Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 946 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Tex. 1997). The Court based the rule on its practical application and effect: "litigants should be able to recognize a judgment which on its face purports to be final, and courts should be able to treat such a judgment as final for purposes of appeal." Inglish, 945 S.W.2d at 811 (quoting Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 592).
Our sister court in Kaigler v. General Electric Mortgage Insurance Corporation, 961 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. App.-Houston [1 st Dist.] 1997, no writ) discussed a similar situation to ours, holding that "The issue in this appeal is whether a Mother Hubbard clause in a summary judgment disposes of all parties and all issues in a case. We conclude that the answer is yes." Id. at 273-74. The Kaigler court then declared that the summary judgment containing a Mother Hubbard clause was an appealable final judgment despite the fact that the summary judgment document did not specifically mention all the parties. Id. at 276. This court ruled in a similar manner in Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 988 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 th Dist.] 1999, pet. granted). Lehmann dealt with a summary judgment order which the parties and the court apparently considered to be interlocutory. However, the summary judgment signed by the judge contained a Mother Hubbard clause: "All reliefnot expressly granted herein is denied." Even though the order did not dispose of all parties, we held that the summary judgment order containing Mother Hubbard language should be treated as final for purposes of appeal. See id. at 417.
Failure to file a notice of appeal from a carelessly worded judgment in a timely manner has harsh consequences. However, such a bright line rule serves the purpose of providing a clear means by which the parties and the courts may determine whether a summary judgment order is finalfor purposes ofappeal. Before Mafrige, the parties and the appellate courts had to look at the live pleadings, the motion for summary judgment, and the summary judgment order to determine whether the order was finalfor purposes of appeal. See Kaigler, 961 S.W.2d at 275. As it now stands, in order to remedy a carelessly worded judgment, the non-movant is required to either 1) ask the trial court to correct the summary judgment containing the Mother Hubbard language while the trial court retains plen
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