|
|
Shelton v. City of Manhattan Beach9/28/2004
th at p. 510.) The Courts of Appeal have found adverse employment action (other than termination) consisting of: denial of a comparable position (Mathieu v. Norrell Corp. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1185-1187); delayed promotion and denial of a position (Perez v. County of Santa Clara (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 671, 676); a negative evaluation accusing a prosecutor of dishonesty and, in effect, precluding promotion (Akers, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1455); suspension and salary reduction (Dudley v. Department of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 264-265); harassment and threatened transfer (Thompson v. Tracor Flight Systems, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1167); denial of a promotion and overtime (Iwekaogwu v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 803, 814); work transferred and flex time eliminated (Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 217); and suspension without pay (Garcia v. Rockwell Internat. Corp. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1556, 1562).
There is evidence in the present case that plaintiff, a police officer with a successful and unblemished record of many years, was, shortly after he lodged his August 22, 2001, internal complaint, subjected to two formal internal affairs investigations, one or more of which may have been unwarranted; further, the goal of the investigations was to demote him or terminate his employment. Until he complained in writing of sexual orientation discrimination on August 22, 2001, plaintiff, in 12 years as a law enforcement officer, had never been the subject of an internal affairs investigation or a citizen complaint. After plaintiff submitted his internal complaint, he was the subject of two formal internal affairs investigations involving his use of a police department credit card, and allegations he had harassed Officers Eccles and Sellan. Captain Marshall, who was in charge of the investigation division, believed the formal inquiries were unwarranted. While the investigations were ongoing and before they were completed, Chief Klevesahl spoke to Captain Marshall. Chief Klevesahl said he wanted to terminate or demote plaintiff based on the ongoing investigations even though they had not yet been completed. Even if the investigations resulted in findings against plaintiff, a reasonable jury would not be precluded from finding one or more of the formal investigations was motivated at least in part by plaintiff's sexual orientation because: plaintiff had a lengthy, unblemished record as a law enforcement officer; the timing of the investigations; and Chief Klevesahl expressed a desire to demote or terminate plaintiff based on the investigations even before they were completed. (See Brandsasse v. City of Suffolk, Va. (E.D.Va. 1999) 72 F.Supp.2d 608, 619-620 [retaliatory investigation was adverse employment action under Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act]; compare, Spain v. City of Winston-Salem (M.D.N.C. 2002) 199 F.Supp.2d 354, 358-359 [internal affairs
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Show All Case Laws California PEO
|